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Boasting aside, Auguste Comte was surely right in considering his discovery 
of the “law of the three states” a most outstanding philosophical achievement. 
For that generalization about the development of human intelligence, which clai-
med that “each branch of our knowledge […] passes in succession through three 
different theoretical states”, namely “the theological or fictitious state, the meta-
physical or abstract, and the scientific or positive state” (Comte, 1975 [1830-1842], 
vol.1,  l.1,  p.21)1, was not only to be seen as a proper explanation of the mental 
evolution of mankind, thereby paving the way for the advent of a science of social 
phenomena. It also provided, through the comparison of these “three methods of 
philosophizing” (ibid.), the various criteria according to which the scientific value of 
that very explanation, and in fact of any explanation whatsoever, could be assessed. 
Accordingly, since the “law of the three states” was indeed, with respect both to its 
intent and content, all about explanation, one is undoubtedly warranted in choosing 
it as a convenient starting point for outlining Comte’s views on the matter.
In what follows, I will therefore present an overview of Comte’s general concep-
tion of scientific explanation that, in addition to summarizing the most well-known 
features of his views (namely, that a positive explanation must promote the unifi-
cation and understanding of phenomena through the discovery of their empirical 
laws), will single out some lesser known elements: the astronomical model on which 
Comte drew to articulate his notion of explanation; his opposition to universal or 
reductionist explanations; his qualified acceptance of hypotheses as explanatory 
devices; the room he made for causal considerations in explanations and the methods 
he advocated to assess them. I then turn more specifically to the topic of sociological 
explanations and to the various forms they might take, before focusing on the way 
Comte dealt with non-social causes such as race and climate in his accounts of social 
phenomena. Finally, I will consider one last aspect of explanation, that of explanation 
as development, which suffuses Comte’s conception of social evolution.
1  In  this  paper,  all  references  to  the  Cours de philosophie positive  will  be  quoted  from 
Comte, 1975 (1830-1842), with the indication of volume, lesson and page; references to the 
Système de politique politique positive will be drawn from Comte, 1929 (1850-1854), with the 
indication of volume, chapter, and page. All translations are mine.
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1. MODES OF EXPLANATIONS
As Laurent Fedi rightly points out, the law of the three states primarily 
consisted in a description of the “modes of explanation the human mind has 
used in its progressive and continuous effort to account for the ‘phenomena’ 
or the ‘facts’” (Fedi, 2000, p.49). In the classic presentation offered in the First 
Lesson of the Cours de philosophie positive, such a description proceeded by way of 
a contrast being drawn between the explanatory schemes distinctive of each 
of the three states of human mental development. In the theological state, 
“the human mind directs its researches mainly towards the inner nature of 
beings, and towards the first and final causes of all the phenomena it observes” 
and “represents these phenomena as being produced by the direct and conti-
nuous action of more or less numerous supernatural agents, whose arbitrary 
intervention explains all the apparent anomalies of the universe” (Comte, 1975 
[1830-1842], vol.1, l.1, p.21, italics mine). “In the metaphysical state, Comte 
went on, the supernatural agents are replaced by abstract forces, real entities or 
personified abstractions, inherent in the different beings of the world”, these 
entities being held “capable of giving rise by themselves to all the phenomena 
observed, each phenomena being explained by assigning to its corresponding 
entity” (ibid., italics mine). Eventually, “in the positive state, the human mind 
[…] endeavors to discover, by a well-combined use of reasoning and observa-
tion, the actual laws of phenomena—that is to say, their invariable relations of 
succession and likeness” (ibid., p.21-22). In that final state, “the explanation of facts 
[…] consists henceforth only in the connection established between different 
particular phenomena and some general facts” (ibid., p.22, italics mine). 
Although the exact difference between the theological and metaphysical 
modes of explanation seems a bit elusive at first (apart from the consideration 
that metaphysical explanations seem to be less anthropomorphic—pointing 
towards “entities” rather than “agents”—and more generic—focusing on the 
causes of “all observed phenomena” instead of “the apparent anomalies of the 
universe”—than theological ones), the distinction between those and the posi-
tive or scientific mode is more straightforward: whereas the theological and 
metaphysical mindsets look for explanations that invoke causes that transcend 
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sensory experience, act non-mechanically or teleologically, and operate on the 
inner, i.e. non-empirically observable, constitution of things, by contrast, from 
the positive standpoint, a particular fact or phenomenon is said to have been 
explained when there exists an empirically warranted proposition, stating a 
general observable connection, either temporal or of resemblance, between 
phenomena or facts, under which it can be subsumed.
Considered normatively, that description of the distinct explanatory modes 
typical of the three states had a direct methodological impact, since it logically 
resulted both into a prescription, which commanded us to consider “all pheno-
mena as subject to invariable natural laws”, the “exact discovery of [which] and 
their reduction to the least number” constituting “the goal of all our efforts” 
(ibid., p.8), and a proscription, which barred our “positive explanations” from 
attempting “to explain the real causes of phenomena”, since “we regard the 
search after what are called causes, whether primary of final, as absolutely 
inaccessible and unintelligible” (ibid.). Hence, by positive standards, good 
explanations should be driven exclusively by the urge to find the nomological 
connections that can be observed to exist between different kinds of pheno-
mena. Accordingly, what marked out the positive explanatory approach from 
its theological and metaphysical counterparts was the emphasis it put on both 
observation, either with respect to the explanandum (only what was observable 
was to explained) or the explanans (only what was observable had explanatory 
power), and generality, a proper explanation consisting in the establishment 
of a logical relation between a singular observable instance of a phenomenon 
or fact and a general statement—what Comte misleadingly called a “general 
fact”—from which it can be inferred2. Accordingly, the “fundamental revo-
lution” brought about by the advent of the positive spirit really consisted “in 
replacing everywhere the inaccessible determination of the causes themselves 
by the mere search for laws, that is the constant relations that exist between 




2. THE ASTRONOMICAL MODEL
As is well known, Comte endorsed a thoroughly naturalistic conception of 
methodology: as he put it to Valat in 1819, “[it] is only by observations appropriately 
made on the general manner of proceeding in each science, on the various courses 
followed to arrive at discoveries, on methods in a word, that one can reach sure and 
useful rules on the way to conduct one’s mind” (Comte, 1973-1990, t.1, p.59). 
In that respect, astronomy, the first natural science in which the positive 
spirit, after having been awakened by the practice of mathematics, had defi-
nitively prevailed, undoubtedly exemplified, in Comte’s eyes, something like a 
methodological ideal3. Accordingly, since it was, “so to speak, the most scienti-
fic of all the sciences” (Comte, 1975 [1830-1842], vol.1, l.19, p.311), Comte argued, 
it was to astronomy that one should turn to “feel, in all its purity, what the 
positive explanation of a phenomenon is” (ibid., p.308).
Such was indeed Comte’s own strategy when it came to introducing the 
readers of the Cours to the basics of a positive explanation, “the most admirable 
example” of which had been supplied by the “Newtonian law of gravitation” 
(ibid., l.1, p.26). But what do we mean exactly when we claim that “the general 
phenomena of the universe are explained” by that law? For Comte, such a law 
explains phenomena positively because it allows both for their unification and 
understanding. On the one hand, “this beautiful theory shows us the immense 
variety of astronomical facts as being only a single fact considered from different 
points of view” (ibid.). On the other hand, “this general fact is introduced to us as 
a mere extension of a phenomenon with which we are already eminently fami-
liar and that we consider, for that very reason, as perfectly known, the gravity 
of bodies at the surface of the earth” (ibid.). As for its logical component, that 
explanation was exemplary to the extent that the variety of motions characte-
ristic of celestial bodies (whether those of planets around the sun, of satellites 





of any astronomical rationale (such as the tides), were captured by one single, 
fundamental, empirically observable, nomological relation, from which, conse-
quently, less fundamental generalizations such as Kepler’s laws can be derived4. 
From the epistemic standpoint, Newton’s law of gravitation properly explained 
astronomical phenomena, Comte maintained, because it fulfilled the only “logi-
cal [i.e.  methodological] necessity […] common to all possible speculations”, 
namely that of “always proceeding from the known to the unknown” (ibid., vol.2, 
l.48, p.121), in that instance by showing that “the continuous tendency of the 
planets towards the sun and of the satellites towards their planets” could be assi-
milated to the “common enough phenomena that gravity continually produces at 
the surface of the globe” (ibid., vol.1, l.24, p.385; see also Comte, 1929 [1850-1854], 
vol.1, chapt.2, p.513). And since, in that very case, “we know, with perfect certainty, 
the existence and the law of both orders of phenomena [i.e. celestial motions and 
terrestrial gravity]” and “we know, furthermore, that they are identical”, we are 
fully justified in claiming that we have here “their true mutual explanation, by way 
of an exact comparison of the lesser known phenomena with the better known 
ones” (Comte, 1975 [1830-1842], vol.1, l.24, p.388).
What is more, it was on a purely observational basis that both the understanding 
was gained and the unification achieved: as to the former, because the similarity 
observed did not rely on “any idle inquiry about the inner nature and primary cause 
of this celestial action or that terrestrial activity” (ibid.); as to the latter, because it only 
amounted to “indicating strictly a simple general fact, mathematically ascertained” 
(ibid.), which both accounted for the already observed phenomena and allowed for 
a prediction of those to come, thereby opening the way for a continuous process of 
verification and pragmatic applications (see ibid., l.19, p.308). In other words, 
the Newtonian discovery […] has shown […] how we could, without penetra-
ting the essence of phenomena, succeed in connecting and assimilating them, 
so as to reach, with equal precision and certainty, the true final end of our real 
studies, that exact prevision of events which a priori conceptions are necessarily 
unable to provide (ibid., l.24, p.392). 
4  See note 2.
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Such an achievement, Comte acknowledged, raised astronomy to “the highest 
philosophical perfection a science could ever hope for with respect to method, 
that exact reduction of all phenomena, either regarding their nature or degree, to 
one single general law” (ibid., l.19, p.308) and brought to light “the true essential 
character of all our positive explanations, which consist in […] connecting and 
assimilating to the fullest extent possible” (ibid., l.24, p.388). Now, what remained 
to be clarified was what exactly this “fullest extent possible” really meant.
3. AGAINST UNIVERSAL EXPLANATIONS 
Although it offered a model to emulate, the methodological blueprint 
supplied by Newton’s law of gravitation could also result, if misapplied, in 
faulty attempts at explanation that would drag us back to the theological or 
metaphysical stages of the development of the human mind. For instance, given 
the unifying power of Newton’s law in the astronomical realm, could it not be 
reasonably assumed that its actual scope be extended to all natural phenomena, 
physical, chemical or biological, and perhaps well beyond, to social and moral 
phenomena? After all, the explanatory drive toward unification, by Comte’s 
own admission, ran through the whole history of human cognitive evolution: 
“the theological system reached the highest perfection it was capable of when it 
replaced the varied play of the many independent deities that had been imagi-
ned primitively with the providential action of a single being” (ibid., l.1, p.22), 
just as “the end point of the metaphysical system consists in conceiving, 
instead of the different particular entities, one single broad general entity, 
nature, considered as the only source of all phenomena” (ibid.). Likewise, “the 
perfection of the positive system, toward which it constantly tends, although 
it is very likely it will never reach it, would amount to being able to represent 
all the various observable phenomena as so many particular cases of one single 
general fact, such as gravitation, for example” (ibid.). Yet, Comte nonetheless 
considered such “attempts at a universal explanation of all phenomena by a 
single law,” even that based on the law of gravitation, which by far looked the 
most promising, “as eminently chimerical” (ibid., p.40). On the one hand, he 
argued, “the resources of the human mind are too scarce and the universe 
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too complicated for such a scientific perfection to ever be within our reach” 
(ibid.; see also Comte, 1995 [1844], p.88). On the other hand, there existed, as 
evidenced by Comte’s own encyclopedic scale of the sciences (Comte, 1975 
[1830-1842], vol.1, l.2), some sort of irreducible phenomenological pluralism 
that prevented the reduction of the various kinds of phenomena covered by the 
different sciences to the laws of one among them5. To be sure, no one could 
deny the objective dependence existing between these various kinds of pheno-
mena (for instance, biological phenomena could not occur in the absence 
of certain astronomical, physical, and chemical conditions), nor the logical 
dependence among the different sciences resulting from it (since one had to 
rely on the methods and results of the previous sciences in the encyclopedic 
scale to be able to explain less general and more complicated phenomena). 
But this did not mean that the different categories of phenomena could “all 
be reduced to one single universal law” (Comte, 1995 [1844], p.87). To believe 
so, Comte would later claim, was to fall prey to a “materialistic” conception 
of explanation, fuelled by an excessive confidence in the deductive power of 
the human mind and which manifested “the spontaneous tendency of lower 
sciences to dominate, and even absorb, higher ones” (Comte, 1929 [1850-1854], 
vol.3, chapt.1, p.43). Explanatory unification also had its limits. 
4. THE POSITIVE THEORY OF HYPOTHESES
The exact empirical content of the Newtonian model might also have 
raised some concern about the positivity of the explanation it was supposed 
to deliver. For what the “minute analysis of celestial phenomena has proven”, 
Comte claimed, was the accuracy of the “great fundamental law” according 
to which “all the molecules of our world gravitate around one another, in 
proportion of their masses and inversely as the squares of their distances” 
(Comte, 1975 [1830-1842], vol.1, l.24, p.390). Now, the very reference to mole-
cules was problematic since it invoked entities inaccessible to the observational 
means presently, thereby infringing the empirical requirement characteristic 
5  What is called today “intertheoretic reduction”.
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of positive explanations. And what about the elusive gravitational force called 
upon by Newton? What could warrant us in discarding theological or meta-
physical explanations that referred to entities that could not be directly obser-
ved and nonetheless lead us to regard as a paradigmatic positive explanation 
a general statement that seemed to fail that very test? Comte had to confront 
such a predicament, not only because the absence of an appropriate response 
would seriously weaken the appeal of his own theory of explanation, but also 
because he was perfectly aware that he had to make empirical good sense of 
the many entities—such as atoms or forces—whose existence was assumed by 
the laws of modern, positive science. In other words, on which grounds were 
we justified to believe in the reality of these hypothetical posits? 
With regard to the reference to the gravitational force, it had to be 
construed, Comte maintained, as a convenient mathematical shorthand for 
describing the observable quantitative relation connecting various kinds of 
bodies, nothing more; it in no way ambitioned to “determine what this attrac-
tion and this gravity are in themselves, or what their causes are” (ibid., l.1, p.26), 
since “any attempt in that direction would be, necessarily, utterly illusory as 
well as perfectly vain” (ibid., l.24, p.388). Furthermore, the “fortunate word 
of gravitation”, invented to state “the fundamental assimilation of gravity with 
the accelerating force of heavenly bodies” (ibid.), conveniently amended the 
“vague and unscientific” image of attraction and its description of “the mode 
of action of the sun on the planets, and of the Earth on massive bodies, by 
comparison with the effort through which we pull toward us, using a rope, a 
distant object” (ibid.): according to such a metaphor, “irrespective of the fact 
that the object be located ten or even a hundred meters away, the same effort 
will attract it toward us by exactly the same quantity, if one neglects the weight 
and the rigidity of the rope” (ibid., p.389), whereas gravity correctly depicted “a 
phenomenon that, for ten times the distance, is necessarily a hundred times 
weaker” (ibid.). In that very case, the gravitational force invoked by Newtonian 
theory was fully legitimate since it both connected a vast array of observable 
phenomena by way of an empirically corroborated mathematical formula and 
unified their understanding by clearing it from any unfounded analogy.
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On the face of it, the reference to molecules, or what Comte also called the 
“corpuscular or atomistic theory” (Comte, 1929 [1850-1854], vol.1, chapt.2, p.520) 
seemed harder to reconcile with the criteria of a positive explanation, especially 
those set out in the “Theory of hypotheses” elaborated in the 28th Lesson of the 
Cours. There, whilst acknowledging the limits of both induction (which aims at 
establishing through observation “the real law of any phenomenon, or the direct 
analysis of the course of that phenomenon” [Comte, 1975 (1830-1842), vol.1, 
l.28, p.457]) and deduction (which attempts to specify “its exact and manifest 
relation with a more general law” [ibid.]), Comte made room for hypotheses 
that, in the absence of empirical evidence or nomological statements, must be 
considered as “mere anticipations of what experience and reasoning would 
have revealed, if the conditions of the problem had been more favorable” (ibid.). 
For instance, Kepler’s painstaking review of the various geometrical figures 
that might account for the planets’ motions around the sun, and his eventual 
discovery that their orbits followed an elliptical trajectory, was by Comte’s own 
prescriptions, a prime illustration of the positive attitude that must guide “the 
rational construction and scientific use of hypotheses” (ibid., p.456): 
a fact is still not well known, or a law is ignored: a hypothesis about it is 
formed, fitting as harmoniously as possible with the whole set of data already 
collected; and science, thus able to develop freely, always ends up leading to 
new observable consequences, which are likely to confirm or infirm, unequi-
vocally, the original conjecture (ibid., p.458). 
Accordingly, as long as the hypothesis only bears on “the laws of 
phenomena” and can be empirically corroborated, it is perfectly “admis-
sible” (ibid.; see also Comte 1929 [1850-1854], vol.1, chapt.2, p.500). On the 
contrary, assumptions that focus on the “inner nature”, “cause, whether 
primary or final”, or “essential mode of production” of phenomena display 
“an anti-scientific character and can only […] hinder the real advancement” 
(Comte, 1975 [1830-1842], vol.1, l.28, p.457) of positive knowledge.
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In light of these methodological prescriptions, what are we to make of the 
molecular hypothesis embedded in the most general formulation of Newton’s 
law of gravitation? Are we to dispose of it, just like we got rid of the chimerical 
“fluids” of metaphysical physics, since they were “explicitly imagined as invi-
sible, intangible and imponderable”, thereby “necessarily evad[ing] any positive 
control” (ibid., p.459)? Quite surprisingly Comte argued that such a rejection was 
not called for: although it is true that “we will necessarily always remain ignorant 
of the inner structure of real substances”, we are nonetheless “rationally autho-
rized to introduce […] all the hypotheses that will help our thoughts, as long as 
these artifices are always in accordance with the nature of the corresponding 
phenomena” (Comte, 1929 [1850-1854], vol.1, chapt.2, p.520). 
Therefore, when we study “the general properties of material existence” (ibid.), 
which is indeed the proper realm of astronomy and physics, we are entitled to 
ascribe them to the “most minute particles we could conceive of” (ibid.). Since, as 
already pointed out in the 3rd Lesson of the Cours and in line with the encyclope-
dic scale of the sciences, “geometry and mechanics constitute […] the two funda-
mental natural sciences, in the sense that all natural effects can be considered as 
mere necessary results either of the laws of extension or of the laws of motion” 
(Comte, 1975 [1830-1842], vol.1, l.3, p.74), the ascription of geometric or mechani-
cal properties to molecules, if it leads to a greater unification in our understanding 
of phenomena and further verifiable empirical predictions, is fully warranted. 
Yet, Comte also emphasized that this vindication of the “relative legitimacy of the 
atomistic hypothesis” distinctly delineated “the exact limits of its normal use”, 
without in any way licensing its “absolute extension” (Comte, 1929 [1850-1854], 
vol.1, chapt.2,  p.521). As he put it, “the corpuscular conception, irrevocably 
reduced to a mere logical artifice, is therefore only appropriate […] to the first 
half of inductive cosmology [i.e. astronomy and physics], where its contribution 
is truly indispensable”, but should not be imported into biology, given the truly 
“synthetic” nature of organic phenomena (which could not be reduced to their 
material components or divided analytically without loosing their most distinc-
tive features), or even into chemistry, where the properties under scrutiny are 
already “too complicated and too variable” “to be usefully imputed to inalterable 
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atoms” (ibid.)6. Just as the scope of the law of gravitation would only encompass a 
definite set of phenomena, the explanatory purview of the molecular hypothesis 
was strictly restricted to a certain portion of reality. 
5. EXPLANATION WITHOUT CAUSATION? 
One of the most striking features of Comte’s methodological views was 
undoubtedly his self-professed aspiration to eliminate causation from scientific 
explanations: “everybody knows”, as he put it quite confidently, “that in our 
positive explanations […], we do not pretend in any way to disclose [exposer] the 
generative causes of phenomena […], but only to analyze accurately the circums-
tances of their production and to connect them with one another by normal 
relations of succession and similarity” (Comte, 1975 [1830-1842], vol.1, l.1, p.26). 
But what motivated that exclusion of causal reasoning from our expla-
natory heuristics? One way to account for such a proscription is to note that 
all the various kinds of “generative causes” targeted by Comte had at least 
one thing in common: whether “primary” (such as God or the self-genera-
tion of the universe) or “final” (such as the realization of the most optimal 
cosmological order), or pointing towards the “inner constitution” of things 
responsible for their manifest properties, they all eluded the possibility of 
being observed empirically. By definition, God could not be scrutinized by 
standard observational procedures, just as there was a logical impossibility in 
observing the first moment of the history of the world; the ideal principles 
supposed to govern the course of events, because of their mental nature, 
also forwent any sensory appraisal; and “essences” and “substances” defi-
nitely exceeded the grasp of our perceptual capacities. Accordingly, since 
“any proposition that is not strictly reducible to the mere stating of a fact, 
either particular or general, can in no way allow for any real and intelligible 
meaning” (Comte, 1995 [1844], p.66), “entities” and “agents” that failed to 




Yet, such an eradication of “generative causes” certainly did not amount to the 
complete disappearance of all causal elements from positive explanatory accounts. 
As John Stuart Mill, a careful reader of both the Cours and the Système de politique posi-
tive, rightfully pointed out, Comte only rejected “questions of ultimate origin, and 
of Efficient as distinguished from what are called Physical causes”, on the grounds 
that those “are not themselves phenomena” (Mill, 1969 [1865], p.292-293). But 
like “other people he admits the study of causes, in every sense in which one 
physical fact can be the cause of the other” (ibid., p.293). 
A good illustration of the persistence of the causal ingredient was, unsur-
prisingly, supplied by the Newtonian theory of gravitation, astronomy once 
again “remaining, with respect to logic, the most perfect type of the gene-
ral study of nature” (Comte, 1975 [1830-1842], vol.2, l.58, p.745). Consider for 
instance the explanation of the tides, where “the elevation of waters” on each 
point of the globe is said to result primarily from “the passing of the moon 
at the local meridian” (Comte, 1995 [1844], p.83). In that context, Comte had 
no qualms resorting to a causal vocabulary when it complied with positive 
standards: he explicitly acknowledged that the variation of water levels was the 
“effect” (Comte, 1975 [1830-1842], vol.1, l.25, p. 403) of the gravitational pull. 
Fully “positivized”, the causal components of the gravitational theory of the 
tides gained true explanatory power: taking into account all the relevant obser-
vable and quantifiable factors, one could conclude that “only the sun, because 
of its enormous mass, and the moon, because of its proximity, must produce 
significant tides”, the “action” of the latter “being between two-and-a-half times 
and three times greater than that of the former” (ibid., p.404). In other words, 
the moon and the sun were held to be genuine positive causes of terrestrial 
tides to the extent that their respective “actions” upon Earth, and their varia-
tions, are invariably connected to the elevation of waters, and determine, in the 
sense of being prior to, its degree. And since all the forces referred to belonged 
to the same kind—that governed by the theory of gravitation—, we were fully 
entitled to say that we had positively explained tides since we had arrived at an 
accurate analysis of “the circumstances of their production” and the identifica-
tion of the “normal relations of succession and similarity [which] connect them 
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with one another” (ibid., l.1, p.26), the best proof of the soundness of that “great 
theory” being afforded by the “exact prevision” of actual tides (ibid., l.25, p.406). 
So, if causation was defined, in good empiricist manner, as constant conjunc-
tion between cause and effect, with the former always preceding the latter, then 
it surely found its place in Comte’s explanatory framework. 
6. EXPLANATION AND ABSTRACTION 
Driven towards unification and observationally warranted, the gravitatio-
nal theory of the tides undoubtedly represented a truly positive account of 
these phenomena. But it also shed a precious light on the best manner of obtai-
ning rational and empirically reliable explanations, for one lesson that could be 
drawn from the way Newton and his followers approached that problem was 
that of the crucial role abstraction played in the explanatory process.
Comte’s philosophical reconstruction of the discovery of the “principle” that 
the “unequal gravitation of the various parts of the Ocean towards any one of 
the heavenly bodies of our world, and most particularly towards the sun and the 
moon” (ibid., p.402) explained terrestrial tides was partly intended to convey 
this importance of abstraction for explanation. Pursuing the idea that “the 
action of any heavenly body on the Ocean […] necessarily tends, in proportion 
of the unequal energy with which it applies to the various locations, to modify 
it slightly”, Newton could “easily calculate the principal part of the phenome-
non” (ibid., p.403), singling out the determining influence of the moon and the 
sun. Once this general mechanism had been described, other relevant factors 
could be taken into account, such as, among others, the daily motion of the 
Earth; and the combined effect of the gravitation resulting from the moon and 
the sun adequately computed. Finally, in order to arrive at theoretical predic-
tions that matched the tidal data collected beforehand, the nature and configu-
ration of the seabed were reckoned with, which contributed to a better approxi-
mation, “in accordance with what had been observed, at each port, [of] the 
two fundamental coefficients, relative to the average height of the tides and the 
time of their full accomplishment, thereby rendering all mathematical deter-
minations compatible enough with reality” (ibid., p.406-407). Now, throughout 
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this process, abstraction was a key “logical procedure” (Comte, 1929 [1850-1854], 
vol.1, chapt.2, p.501) in that it allowed for the putting aside of the “secondary 
irregularities that would prevent one from grasping the main law with which 
one then tries to connect every minor circumstance of the phenomenon at 
hand” (ibid.). Such was, Comte claimed, “the only rational course that may 
lead […] to the real discovery of the fundamental laws of nature” and that was 
indeed the general method actually followed, not only for the tides, but for 
rational mechanics at large, considering “first celestial motions through their 
most essential features, carefully ignoring [faisant abstraction] all the perturba-
tions, which could then be gradually related to that same principle of gravi-
tation resulting from that mere initial appraisal” (Comte, 1985 [1844], p.474; 
see also Comte, 1929 [1850-1854], vol.1, chapt.2, p.502). If one had proceeded 
the other way around, Comte concluded, “considering all these phenomena 
only in their full actual complexity, it is clear that no mechanical theory would 
ever have been established” (Comte, 1985 [1844], p.474). In other words, a 
good positive explanation was not merely an explanation based on laws from 
which phenomena could be derived or predicted, but also an explanation that 
could be capable of singling out essential conditions from accessory circums-
tances or, to put it in causal language, to weigh the various causes according to 
their importance in the production of the phenomena, clearly distinguishing 
between primary “influences” and secondary “perturbations”7.
Astronomy certainly made it easier to grasp the role of abstraction and the 
importance of fundamental laws in positive explanations, primarily because of 
the simplicity of the phenomena considered, of the analytical approach prevai-
ling in their study, and of the fortunate, although contingent, fact that they could 
be reduced to a few basic laws, most notably that of gravitation. But the search for 
the most fundamental laws, or for the most important causes, was nonetheless 






subject, a definite explanatory scheme was shared by all sciences and, accordingly, 
it was only through its study “that sociologists” could get “an appropriate general 
idea of the essential attributes of scientific positivity”, and especially of “what 
the real explanation of any phenomenon consists in” (Comte, 1975 [1830-1842], 
vol.2, l.49, p.167). Of course, it would remain for sociologists to discover how 
to apply properly that methodological lesson to the study of social phenomena.
7. SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS 
For Comte, no serious doubt could entertained as to the methodological 
orientation that would prove the most appropriate for the scientific study of social 
phenomena, the last domain of reality not to have been fully positivized: anyone 
duly acquainted with the doctrines and methods of both the inorganic and organic 
sciences should clearly see that “our positive explanations constantly amount […] 
to connecting various phenomena with one another, either as similar or successive, 
without us being in any way capable of, in any respect, really observing anything 
beyond the invariable fact of such similarity or succession” (ibid., l.58, p.724). 
Thanks to the knowledge of these “filiations” and “successions”, Comte 
claimed, we would be able “to reach the true aim of any sound contemplation 
of nature”, namely to have phenomena “on the one hand, clarified [éclaircis] 
and, on the other hand, predicted, by one another” (ibid.). The blueprint was 
straightforward, but how did it exactly play out in the sociological sphere? 
Quite simply actually, since the architectonics of positive sociology drew 
on a doctrinal distinction, which originated in mechanics but was only fully 
elaborated in biology, between statics and dynamics, social statics studying “the 
conditions of existence of society” whilst social dynamics dealt with “the laws of 
its continuous motion” (ibid., l.48, p.109). Accordingly, it considered “each pheno-
mena under the dual elementary perspective of its harmony with co-existing 
phenomena and its concatenation [enchaînement] with the previous state and the 
following state of human development” (ibid., p.136), striving to discover “the 
true general relations connecting all social facts” (ibid.). Hence, within a posi-
tive perspective, “any of them […] is held to be explained, in the truly scientific 
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meaning of the term, when one has succeeded in properly connecting it either 
to the whole corresponding situation or to the whole previous motion” (ibid.). 
Now, this generic characterization somewhat downplayed the variety of 
explanatory arguments the positive sociologist could rely on. As for social, 
statics, there were indeed various ways one could positively explain a given 
social phenomena, a diversity that, in the end, traced back to a distinctive 
feature of the social world, namely the solidarity existing among the various 
elements that composed social aggregates such as civilizations or societies. 
Given the preponderance of that “social consensus”, which Comte considered 
the “key idea of social statics” (ibid., p.118), one was perfectly entitled to resort 
to structural explanations: the existence or action of a specific social element 
would be corroborated by the acknowledgement that it is an indispensable part 
of the “social organism” (ibid., p.112) at large; for instance, according to Comte, 
government will always be divided between a temporal and a spiritual power, 
since it has been observed that such a division has been an essential element 
of any society observed so far. But one can also use functional explanations, 
extending to social phenomena the “principle of the conditions of existence” 
(ibid., vol.1, l.40, p.738) already prevalent in biology: since “there is no organ 
without function and no function without organ” (ibid.), once the existence 
of a social group is duly attested, it might be inferred that it exists to serve a 
certain purpose, just as one might infer from the existence of a given social 
need the necessity of a group or mechanism to fulfill it. For instance, just as 
the sacerdotal class catered for the spiritual needs of populations in theological 
societies, scientists, in the positive state, will have to provide modern socie-
ties with a new rational creed. Furthermore, there is always the possibility of 
supplying mechanical explanations, which would shed light on the “mutual 
actions and reactions that the various parts of the social system constantly exert 
on one another” (ibid., vol.2, l.48, p.111), just as when one explains the progres-
sive disappearance of the military spirit by the rise of industrial collaboration. 
Finally, all these different kinds of static explanations fully satisfied “the most 
unquestionable criteria of scientific positivity”, namely “the principle of ratio-
nal prevision”, since they all allowed for “sociological previsions, based on an 
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exact knowledge of these necessary relations, [which] will be duly aimed at 
deriving from one another, in accordance with future direct observations, the 
various static indications relative to each mode of social existence” (ibid.). 
As to social dynamics, its explanations primarily consisted in showing each 
social state, historically considered, “as the necessary result of the previous one 
and the indispensable force behind the next” (ibid., p.123). Here, Comte’s intel-
lectualism, that is the primacy he granted to the development of the mind in 
human evolution, played a key explanatory role, since any given transformation, 
whether technological, political, esthetic, religious or moral, would have to be 
connected with a corresponding intellectual advancement. That was why the 
law of the three states was so crucial in Comte’s overall scheme: it identified 
the main causal influence at work in the history of mankind, from which all 
other social trends could be, more or less directly, derived. And since that law 
was, so to speak, maximally explanatory—it unified the whole field cognitive 
phenomena under a single law; it clarified the fact of mental progress, because, 
as Comte put it (ibid., vol.1, l.1, p.22), the intellectual development of mankind as 
a whole was mirrored in our personal intellectual development; and, as illus-
trated by the Cours itself, it was corroborated by the history of the sciences—any 
explanatory inference properly drawn from it would partake in its positivity. 
To be sure, the global perspective favored by social dynamics seemed to 
ignore an awful lot of historical details, thereby apparently belying the self-
professed dedication of the positive method to the study of facts; but as in 
static explanations, the synthetic spirit also prevailed in dynamic ones; hence 
Comte’s decision to resort to the legitimate “hypothesis of a single people”, 
borrowed from Condorcet, around which he structured the narrative of the 
Cours, so as to be able to present a unified and rational picture of “all the 
successive social modifications actually observed in distinct populations” 
(ibid., vol.2, l.48, p.123), which would have been deprived of any fix meaning 
had they not been connected first, be it by a mere provisional hypothesis, to 
the fundamental laws of social development” (ibid., p.140).
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Similarly, given the importance ascribed to predictive accuracy as a reliable 
sign of explanatory validity, one might have been puzzled by Comte’s reluctance in 
the Cours, and later in the Système, to deliver clear indications of the future course 
of events that could be precise enough to infirm or confirm sociological theories. 
Yet, one might still have argued, relying on Comte’s own analysis, that, due to 
the complexity of social phenomena, which were indeed the most intricate of 
all natural phenomena, the best one could hope for was merely the formulation 
of large scale historical trends. Accordingly, one would have to confine oneself to 
conjecturing something like “the continuous increase of any disposition, whether 
physical, intellectual, moral or political, combined with the indefinite decrease 
of the opposite disposition, from which will result the scientific prediction of 
the ultimate prevalence of the one and the final demise of the other” (ibid., p.151). 
More concretely, Comte maintained, “the general result of our fundamen-
tal evolution” would amount to, besides “improving the material condition of 
man, through the continuous extension of its action on the external world”, 
developing primarily, through an increasingly significant exercise, our most 
eminent faculties, either by constantly reducing the empire of physical inclina-
tions, and by stimulating further our social instincts, or by constantly exciting the 
development of intellectual functions, even the highest, and by increasing spon-
taneously the regular influence of reason on the conduct of man (ibid., l.51, p.204). 
But to look for a more specific kind of prediction would have been sheer 
prophecy or a vain search for absolute certainty. Such was, Comte concluded, 
“the only kind of precision, compatible with the excessive complexity of these 
phenomena, upon which constantly act so many influences, some of them 
regular, some others accidental” (ibid., l.48, p.151). But then, and even if it accep-
ted to settle for such a moderate predictive ambition, sociology still had to 
make sure it had correctly addressed that challenge of causal complexity, lest its 
conjectures be deprived of any empirical value. 
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8. PRINCIPAL AND SUBORDINATE CAUSES IN SOCIOLOGY 
It was no coincidence that the discovery of the law of the three states promp-
ted Comte to find a way of disentangling the causal web characteristic of social 
phenomena. For, as he put it in his Plan des travaux scientifiques nécessaires pour réorganiser 
la société, although the “experience of the past proves most decisively that the 
progressive development of civilization is subject to a natural and irrevocable 
course” (Comte, 1998 [1822], p.93), it also showed that “the course of civilization 
is […] modifiable, to greater or lesser extent, in its speed, within certain limits, 
by several physical and moral causes” (ibid., p.97). Given the ultimate political 
purpose of his philosophical enterprise—providing a comprehensive scheme 
for the government of modern societies based on a scientific understanding of 
their historical evolution—Comte could not eschew the exact determination of 
the various circumstances that might hasten or hinder the development he was 
supposed to assist8. And to do so, Comte indeed proposed the very same approach 
used by Newtonian mechanics9: one must first try “to establish the general course 
of the human race, in abstraction from all the various causes which can modify 
the rate at which civilization develops”, and only then “assess the influence of 
these modifying causes” (ibid., p.139). Hence the “obligation to treat the first order 
of works before the second” (ibid.) to arrive at a proper sociological explanation. 
The dire consequences of infringing that rule were perfectly illustrated, 
in Comte’s eyes, by the unfortunate case of Montesquieu. A key contributor 
to the “positivization” of social science, for he was the first to see clearly that 
the “general idea of law” could also be applied to political facts, Montesquieu 
nonetheless seriously erred when, trying “to determine the political influence 
of local physical circumstances” (ibid., p.114), “he much exaggerated the 
influence of climates” (ibid.), erroneously regarding the latter as the primary 
cause of many political differences among nations. That error was “inevitable”, 
Comte claimed, because Montesquieu considered “the indirect and subordi-




is the development of mankind. “No doubt climate does exercise a very real 
influence on political phenomena”, Comte acknowledged, but it was “limited 
to accelerating or retarding, up to a point, the natural course of civilization, 
which cannot be diverted by these modifications” (ibid.). Yet, Montesquieu’s 
mistake still shed a precious light on the right way of explaining the influence 
“of all the other causes which can modify the course of civilization in its 
speed without altering its essence” (ibid.). For this influence, Comte argued, 
“will only be capable of being determined with precision when the natural 
laws of civilization have been established, by first abstracting from all these 
modifications”, just as astronomers did when they “began studying the laws of 
planetary movements, abstracting from perturbations” (ibid.). Had they tried to 
take into account the irregularities from the beginning, Comte concluded, “no 
exact theory could ever have been formed” (ibid., p.115). 
Comte zealously applied that prescription in Lessons 46 to 57 of the Cours, 
where he exposed the most basic laws of social phenomena, whilst reminding 
his readers, as some sort of cautionary tale, of Montesquieu’s blunder and his 
confusion of the “fundamental action” of human development with the “mere 
modification” brought about by climate, of his mistaking “essential laws” for 
“perturbations” (Comte, 1975 [1830-1842], vol.2, l.47, p.87). But despite the 
terminological sanitization, the key issue still remained that of distinguishing 
the “fundamental cause” from the “perturbing” ones (ibid., l.48, p.132) in socio-
logical analysis. At present, Comte acknowledged, with sociology still trying 
to establish its nomological basis, it would have been “premature” to draw “a 
definitive classification of the various modifying influences” (ibid., p.133); but 
he nonetheless singled out as the most important “sources of social variations”, 
“race”, “climate” and “political action” (ibid.). Yet, Comte also made clear that 
one should be extremely cautious when attempting to explain social pheno-
mena, either static or dynamic, by invoking these influences. As to the latter, 
men generally tended to exaggerate their power over the course of human 
affairs, when they in fact could merely hinder or hasten its speed. As for climate 
and race, the mere comparison of various populations to assess their impact 
was misleading, for it neglected to take into account the nature and direction 
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of human evolution: too often, Comte lamented, one ascribed to the “action [of 
climate] social differences that might primarily be traced to the inequality of 
evolution” (ibid., p.147), just as one could easily “confuse the influence of race and 
that of the social era, either by exaggerating or downplaying one or the other” 
(ibid., p.148). Beyond these methodological warnings, what Comte seemed ready 
to assert about these “modifying influences” remained quite generic, although 
it clearly marked the ultimate primacy and universality of social causes: on the 
one hand, “local physical causes”, such as climate, although “very powerful at 
the beginning of civilization”, “gradually lose their empire as the naturel course 
of human development allows more and more for the neutralization of their 
action”; on the other hand, “one should not overstate “the necessary influence 
of organic diversities on mental conceptions”, since “the knowledge characte-
ristic of all the various races do nonetheless have a genuinely common basis, 
which is more or less correctly understood by more or less perfect, but still 
radically homogeneous, understandings” (ibid., l.58, p.729). 
Ten years or so later, the Système de politique positive eventually supplied 
what Comte regarded as the definitive, if sketchy, scientific assessment of 
the influence of climate and race on social phenomena. Recast within the 
context of a compulsively finicky “positive theory of social modificability” 
(Comte, 1929 [1850-1854], vol.2, chapt.7, p.430), Comte’s appraisal of these two 
classes of “modifications characteristic of social existence” (ibid., p.439) was 
firmly grounded in the familiar principle that they would “bear only on the 
intensity of phenomena in static sociology, and on their speed in dynamic socio-
logy” (ibid., p.444), without transforming their fundamental laws. To this, Comte 
added the noteworthy qualification that social evolution itself progressively 
mitigated their effects. For instance, due to technological improvements, Earth 
“tends to become uniformly habitable, except for too adverse locations”, a proof 
that “civilization almost cancels influences” such as climate and a momentous 
inversion in the history of mankind Comte oddly chose to illustrate by pointing 
out that “the artificial heat of Russian cities often renders menstruation there as 
precocious as it is in India” (ibid., p.461). As for racial diversity, which he ascri-
bed to “local influences slowly accumulated by heredity, until it produced the 
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corresponding maximum of organic variation” (ibid., p.449), Comte noted that 
it also could only “affect the speed of our common evolution, without altering 
in any way its nature or its course”. But its impact also declined both because 
“an increasing mixing [of races] tends to destroy directly this source of modi-
fications” and because “the whole of human development gradually exempts us 
from it” (ibid., p.461). So, it was only once one had grasped correctly the scheme 
according to which human evolution unfolded—something Comte dogmati-
cally asserted he had done in the Système—that the weight of these “modifiers” 
(ibid., p.451) on social phenomena could be duly assessed. Otherwise, “mere 
differences in intensity and speed end up being paraded as radical diversities, 
thereby casting aside any authentically general conception, and with it any 
sound explanation” (ibid., p.450). In other words, good explanatory sociological 
practice relied on the positive principle that “progress [was] the necessary deve-
lopment of order” (ibid., p.425), a clear understanding of its evolutionary laws, 
and the acknowledgment that the power of “modifying influences” such as 
climate and race was historically relative and gradually decreasing. Such was the 
proper way of disentangling the causal web social phenomena were caught in. 
CONCLUSION 
Explanation as development 
Although it might come as a surprise, since Comte is not exactly a fashio-
nable philosophical reference these days, there is much in his views on scienti-
fic explanation that a reader interested in the recent literature on the subject will 
find familiar and relevant to his concerns: the idea that a good explanation must 
promote the unification and understanding of phenomena, whilst allowing for 
empirical verifications; the emphasis put on laws as a key element of the expla-
natory process; the inquiry into the proper scope of explanations and the role 
hypotheses play in it; the appraisal of the causal component of explanation and 
the search for the best way of weighing causes. Of course, there is also much 
in the manner Comte addressed these questions and the answers he suggested 
one could disagree with, object to, or simply question: his endorsement of a 
single explanatory model for all kinds of phenomena; his belief that the law of 
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the three states was the explanatory key of sociological investigations; the intel-
lectualism and historicism on which it depended; or his downplaying of non-
social causes (such as climate and race) in the explanation of social phenomena. 
For want of space, I will not attempt to settle the score here. Rather, I would like 
to consider one final aspect of Comte’s views on explanation that, although not 
as apparent as what we have covered so far, is nonetheless crucial for a complete 
understanding of his conception of the matter. 
In De l’explication dans les sciences, Émile Meyerson 1927 (1921) took issue at the 
philosophical theory that reduced explanation to a mere process of subsumption 
under phenomenal laws, a position for which, he claimed, Comte’s positive philo-
sophy provided an almost perfect illustration. According to that view, “when we 
have properly scrutinized, penetrated a phenomenon, when we have rendered 
obvious its most tenuous details […], we will have explained it, i.e. our understan-
ding of that very phenomenon will be perfect and our intelligence will therefore 
have to declare itself fully satisfied” (ibid., p.18). As we have seen (section 2 supra), 
Comte’s emphasis on understanding as intelligibility certainly echoed that dimen-
sion of explanation. But there was more to it than met the eyes, literally. 
For, traced to its Latin root explicare, this cognitive operation evoked the 
process of “unfolding” a piece of fabric, so as to show “what it hid beneath 
its folds” (ibid., p.17). Now, this metaphor of “unfolding” was at the heart 
of Comte’s view of social evolution, seen as the “simple spontaneous deve-
lopment, gradually aided by an appropriate cultivation, of the preexisting 
fundamental faculties that constitute our nature” (Comte, 1975 [1830-1842], 
vol.2,  l.48,  p.129), a view that ran through the Plan10 and the Cours11, before 
becoming a central tenet of the Système12. So, when he wanted to provide a 
“summary explanation” (ibid., l.51, p.202) of the progressive course of human 
affairs, it was naturally through the lens of the developmental perspective that 





in a more pronounced manifestation of the main properties of our species, 
which, at first concealed by an inevitable numbness, could only become salient 
enough in a high degree of social life” (ibid.). History was the medium in which 
this development took place and it was the goal of sociology to explain it by 
stating the laws of its unfolding. Such was the last, but certainly not the least, 
acceptation of the term “explanation” as Comte understood it.
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